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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The general rule is well settled that in the
the claim be timely?
absence of an express statute22 the claim for exemption must be made
within a reasonable time and a claim 2 made at any time before sale
under execution comes within the rule.
The courts of Washington have held that a judgment against a
garnishee defendant is the same as a sale under execution. In the
case of United States Fidelity Co. v. Hollenshead2 4 the defendant made
no claim for exemption until after trial on the garnishment proceedings
and announcement of the judgment against the garnishee defendant.
On the day prior to the formal entry of the judgments, the defendant
made his claim for exemption. Held That it was not timely. This
case then merely holds that the defendant is bound to set up his every
claim or demand before trial to the end that the court shall not render
an improvident judgment. In the course of its opinion the court says
that a garnishment is a proceeding in rem and that the effect of the
judgment in such proceeding is to put the parties in a like position as
if the sheriff had made a sale of personal property and paid the proceeds into the registry of the court to be applied in satisfaction of the
This case was cited and affirmed in the case of Hanson v.
judgment.
25
Hodge.
A claim for exemption is therefore timely in Washington if made
at any time before judgment in garnishment proceedings or before
sale under execution or attachment.
Maurice W Orth.
POWER OF CORPORATION TO DISCHARGE THOSE EMPLOYED UNDER
CONTRACT FOR TERM OF YEARS-This note will be limited to an
exposition of the law of the state of Washington with only a brief

reference to that of foreign states.
Unfortunately for the prospective employee of a Washington corporation, the right to discharge him, even though employed under
written contract for a term of years, is regulated by statute. The
pertinent clause reads that the corporation shall have power "to
appoint such officers, agents, and servants as the business of the corpora-

tion shall require, to define their powers, prescribe their duties, and to
fix their compensation.
"To require of them such security as may be thought proper for
the fulfillment of their duties and to remove them at will except that

no trustee shall be removed from office unless by a vote of two-thirds

1
of the stockholders as hereinafter provided."
Whatever the law might be, in the absence of this express declaration of the legislature, is not in issue, for the law-making branch of

=Washington has no express statute on this point.
I State ex rel. Hill v. (ardner 32 Wash. 550, 73 Pac. 690 (1903) United
States Fidelity Co. v. Hollenshead, 51 Wash. 396, 98 Pac. 749 (1909) Messenger
v. Murphy, 33 Wash. 353, 74 Pac. 480 (1903).
251 Wash. 326, 98 Pac. 749 (1909).
192 Wash. 426, 159 Pac. 388 (1916).
'Rem. Comp. Stat., § 3809 [5], P C. § 4515 [5].

NOTES AND COMMENT
our state government has spoken in no uncertain terms. Even the
slight ambiguity felt to be present by the first court interpreting this
section has not been resolved.
The scope and intent of the provision of our law relative to corporations, cited above, was first questioned in Llewellyn v. Aberdeen Brewing Co.2 decided in 1911. The plaintiff here had been employed for
a term of three years as attorney and assistant manager and had been
discharged by the trustees before the expiration of the term. The
court in its opinion intimated that the only employees who could be
discharged at will were those of a fiduciary character.' As to these,
however, the law so provided for the benefit of the stockholders, for
in the absence of such a salutary enactment, the trustees could perpetuate policies of their own and leave the stockholders powerless to
redress this abuse of power. The plaintiff was bound to be aware
of this restriction on the authority of the trustees and made his contract subject to it.
After a consideration of the language the court had used in this
opinion there were still two questions undecided. If this law were
passed in the interests of the stockholders, could it be waived by them?
Also, were not ordinary agents and servants exempt from the operation
of this statute? The opinion in Hewson v. Peterman Mfg. Co.,4
rendered in 1913, followed the earlier case without limiting or enlarging its scope.
The first point was decided adversely to the interest of the employee
four years later by the Supreme Court.5 The contract here involved
called for the employment of plaintiff as general manager for a period
of five years. The contract was authorized by the board of trustees
and the unanimous vote of the stockholders. The opinion in the case
recites the fact that the corporate laws of the state of Washington
place the exercise of the corporate powers in the hands of the board
of trustees.6 The reasoning continues to the conclusion that the
stockholders, not having the power to compel or authorize the employment of any person, cannot ratify the employment so as to take away
the discretion which is vested in the trustees. Granting the proposition that the stockholders can authorize contracts of employment, then
the lack of objection on their part to any contract for personal service
made by the board of trustees, would imply an authorization and defeat
65 Wash. 319, 118 Pac. 30, Ann. Cas. 1913 B 667 (1911).
"The expression
court used the following language (p. 391)
'officers, agents and servants'
contemplates employees of a fiduciary
character who are to occupy positions of responsibility and trust as subdivision
5 provides that such security as may be thought proper may he required of
them for the fulfillment of their duties."
Again on page 323, "Our statute not only includes officers, but also agents
and servants, evidently referring to such representatives as will occupy positions of responsibility and trust"
' 76 Wash. 600, 136 Pac. 1158, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 398, Ann. Cas. 1915 D,
2The

346 2(1913).

Murray v. MacDougall I Southwzck Co., 88 Wash. 358, 153 Pac. 317

(1915).
0

Rem. Comp. Stat., § 381-.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the express policy of the law which is the safe-guarding
interests.

of their

This power of the trustees being settled beyond question, the scope
of the phrase "officers, agents and servants" was next submitted for
review Two cases, 7 one involving the employment of an assistant
horticulturist and the other of a railway switchman, gave to the word
"servant" its generally accepted meaning so that this phrase under
the present adjudications includes all employees of a corporation.
Whether the legislature contemplated or realized the effect of such a
broad inclusion, it is impossible to determine, but having spoken, it
has placed those who contract with corporations for employment in
this state upon a more unfavorable plane than such persons residing in
any other jurisdiction.
In the absence of statute or by-law, officers and directors can be
removed for cause only 8 Servants and lesser agents employed under
contract for a definite term, cannot be removed at will and if discharged
are entitled to damages. Many states have a statute, or the corporation itself a by-law, to the effect that directors and officers are removable at the pleasure of the board. 9 This does not, however, give the
board the right to remove others employed'under contract for a definite
term without redress. 10 Even under such a statute or by-law officers
when bound by definite contract can not be discharged at will in the
majority of jurisdictions." 1
'Barager v. Arcadia Orchards Co., 91 Wash. 994, 157 Pac. 675 (1916)
Williams v. Great Northern R. Co., 108 Wash. 344, 184 Pac. 340 (1919). In
the Barager case the court treated as dictum the statement in the Llewellyn
case, as to officers, agents and servants, as including only employees of a
fiduciary character. The court said in part, "Conceding for argument's sake,
that respondent (an assistant horticulturist) was not an officer or agent of
appellant, it seems to us that he was, in any event, a servant of appellant
within the commonly accepted meaning of that term." 35 Cyc. 1430. If the
word "servant" as here used means only some employee of a corporation
inclusive of the terms "officers" or "agents" then the word "servants" must
be considered of some force as here used, under well recognized rules of
statutory construction.
'FLETCHER'S CYCLOPEDIA OF CoaroATIoNs, § 1814.
'Douglas v. Merchants Insurance Co., 118 N. Y. 484, 7 L. P, A. 899 (1890).
" Munn v. Wellsburg Banking k Trust Co., 66 W Va. 204, 66 S. E. 230
(1909).
This case decided that a bookkeeper was not an officer or an agent and
so did not come under the statute. The court went on to say, "It has been
held in this and other states that while the power and authority to remove or
discharge a servant of a corporation exists the corporation is nevertheless
liable in damages for a breach of the contract with such servant."
1 In Guppy v. Stollwerck Bros., 916 N. Y. 591, 111 N. E. 949, the opinion
contained the following:
"While the by-law empowered the board of directors to remove a director
or officer, it did not authorize them to terminate a contract with one whom
The power to remove him
they had employed for a definite term.
from the office to which he had been elected did not carry with it the right
to discharge him from the employment of the defendant in view of the
special contract for a fixed term under which he was employed."
Also Hand v. Clearfield Coal Co., 143 Pa. 408, 99 A. 709.

NOTES AND COMMENT
It would seem that a statute rendering nugatory a contract of employment between a corporation and a stranger for a fixed and definite
term is harsh and not consonant with business practices. Law is unceasingly harmonizing itself with customs and rules extant in the marts
of trade and adopting them as its own after they have been firmly
established. Under present conditions, the person who offers his personal services to a corporation is penalized and placed at a disadvantage suffered by no other one dealing with a corporate 'body All others
who enter into a contract with a board of trustees receive a valid
instrument even though it extends over a period of time.
The interests of the stockholders should weigh no more heavily in
connection with the employee to his prejudice than with the countless
others dealing with the corporation. The evils of allowing the trustees
to contract for supplies, equipment and kindred commodities have never
been so great that they have been placed under the attention of the
legislators of this state. The privilege, allowed in other jurisdictions
but denied in this, has not been disastrous to the well-being of foreign corporations. Neither has it been irksome to the stockholders nor
the cause of diminishing profits.
W Harold Hutchinson.
THE EVIDENTIAL FORCE OF HABIT AND REPUTE AS OPPOSED TO
THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW CONCERNING MARRIAGE-The Washington

decisions have settled beyond a doubt that a valid marriage can not
take place in this state in any manner other than that prescribed by
statute. The statutes were originally enacted in 1854 and have come
down to us with practically no alterations and with but few additions.'
As early as 1892 it was decided that the statutory requirements were
mandatory, that a ceremony was essential and that common law marstate, were invalid. Thus the substantive law has
riages, in this
2
become fixed.
The necessary consequence of the recognition by the common law
of the validity of marriage by private consent, was that such a marriage could be proven by co-habitation and reputation, such co-habitation and reputation being required as the equivalent of a contract in
present words between the parties and as effective to render them husband and wife. 3 It was not the public acknowledgment of each other
as husband and wife, nor the assumption of the marital rights and
duties, nor the general reputation of the parties as husband and wife
that constituted a marriage. The substantive common law required
a present agreement between the parties to take each other as husband
and wife. Yet, because of the private nature of the marriage, there

was rarely an eye witness to prove such consent. To foster wholesome living, the law therefore adopted a rule of evidence allowing
Rem. Comp. Stat, §§ 8437-8454, me.
In re McLaughlin's Estate, 4 Wash. 570, 30 Pac. 651, 16 L. R. A. 699
(1892).
'Travers v. Reinhardt, -05 U. S. 423, 51 L. Ed. 865, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563;
Eaton v. Eaton, 66 Nebr. 676, 92 N. W 995, 1 Ann. Cas. 199 (1902).

